VIEWS & REVIEWS The Hermeneutics of Critical Buddhism by O\u27Leary Joseph S.
The Hermeneutics of Critical Buddhism
J oseph  S. O’Leary
Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto ShirO, the inaugurators of Critical Bud­
dhism (=  CB), have assumed the most elevated responsibility that scholars of 
religion can incur. They are reformers, recalling a tradition to its central, or­
thodox line of development and purging it of accretions that have covered 
over this central truth. What they are doing is reminiscent of what Luther did 
for Christianity, when he rediscovered the Pauline vision of justification by 
faith and tested the entire tradition against it, or what Heidegger did for the 
Western metaphysical tradition in recalling it to its forgotten ground in a con­
templative thinking of being. Whereas many scholars of religion want to 
reduce their subject matter to a branch of anthropology, dismissing any con­
cern with the truth of religious claims, CB seeks to raise religious studies to the 
Buddhist equivalent of a “ theological”  level, something many scholars of religion 
would see as a betrayal of the founding charter of their discipline. The friction 
is acerbated by the absence of a confessional Buddhist science comparable to 
church-sponsored Christian theology, so that Buddhist scholars have to put their 
faith on hold when they enter the academy, disguising themselves as objective 
historians of religion.
According to Dan Lusthaus, when the Chinese rejected Hsiian-tsang’s 
presentation of Indian Buddhist ideas, “ East Asian Buddhism returned with 
deliberateness and passion to its own earlier misconceptions instead of return­
ing to the trajectory of Indian Buddhism from which it believed it had been 
spawned”  (B 35). CB, armed with the Sanskrit and Tibetan sources of original 
orthodox Buddhism, takes on the gigantic task of correcting this heterodox 
bend in the tradition. Since it is nothing less than “ the inevitable revisiting of 
a theme that has been central to Buddhism since its onset”  (B 30), CB has ac-
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cess to a commanding vision, commensurate with the central concerns of the 
tradition, and is to this extent properly equipped for its reforming task. A 
challenge having such deep historical roots suggests the possibility of a vast 
and thorough recontextualization of East Asian Buddhism.
But the vision and the potential revolution are largely obstructed by 
methodological inadequacies. The drastic position CB has taken up needs to 
be tempered. Protest and polemic need to flower into a more fecund art of 
criticism. I write the following essay as a request for a second wave of CB, 
which will more fully release the transformative energies of tradition and of 
scholarly questioning of tradition. The first wave, defined by the manifestos of 
the movement—Hakamaya’s Hongaku shisO hihan (1989) and Hihan BukkyO 
(1990) and Matsumoto’s Engi to kU (1989)—has perhaps petered out. I am not 
aware that their more recent philological labors on Yogacar a, DOgen, and 
Tibetan Buddhism bring a development of their position. If they have, the fol­
lowing remarks may apply only to the more youthful Hakamaya and Ma­
tsumoto. The mixed reactions to their work can be sampled in Pruning the 
Bodhi Tree (1997). Whether the debate has been carried farther in the 
Japanese literature I do not know.
Purging Buddhist History
That a religious tradition should undergo “ theological”  revaluation is not 
only salutary; it is inevitable as long as the tradition is alive at all, particularly 
in the case of a tradition itself born as a critical reforming movement within In­
dian religion. Religious traditions are subject to subtle corruption, to forget­
fulness of their initial vision, and a diagnosis of such corruption is essential to 
the theological task. Protestantism has a whole gallery of diagnostic labels to 
discern the errors of Catholicism, even in the New Testament where “ early 
Catholicism” already begins to make its fateful appearance. Catholicism has 
been equally sensitive to deviations suggesting a “ Protestantization”  of the 
faith. And all branches of Christianity inherit the patristic “ medicine chest” 
(Epiphanius) of diagnoses: Gnosticism, Docetism, Marcionism, Modalism, 
Montanism, Arianism, Macedonianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism, 
Monotheletism, Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and many more. Such labels 
can take on a life of their own, producing a hermeneutics of suspicion which 
functions as an ideological weapon. The equivalent medicine chest in Bud­
dhism would center on the disease defined by the Buddha himself, the ignor­
ance and craving that projects a substantial permanence onto the self and dhar­
mas. Religious diagnosis is applied not only to the irreligious worldling but 
first and foremost to religious visions that fail in their salvific task, such as the 
ntmavOda of Brahmanism and its recurrences in subtler forms within Bud-
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dhism itself.
CB sees the majority of Buddhists as having forgotten or betrayed or­
thodoxy by falling back into atmavada or what Matsumoto calls dhatuvada, 
“ a substantialist monism in which the Buddha-nature is the sole foundational 
reality out of which apparent reality is produced”  (B 181). This heresy is 
found in Abhidharma (which spatializes time; E 28), early Mahayana stQpa 
veneration (B 400), Yogacara, Chinese Madhyamika, the Nirvana SQtra, the 
Kegon SQtra (where time disappears altogether), the Tathagatagarbha litera­
ture, Mikkyd and Tibetan tantrism, Lin-chi and other Taoist-influenced Zen 
essentialists down to D. T. Suzuki, Nishida and the Kyoto school, Umehara 
Takeshi (a favorite whipping-boy) and all other representatives of Japanism, 
Watsuji TetsurO, Ui Hakuju, Hirakawa Akira, Nakamura Hajime, and a host 
of lesser Japanese Buddhologists. The pillars of orthodoxy are few, and even 
they have to be purified: they include (1) the Buddha, except insofar as he com­
promised his message with older ways of thinking: “ Sakyamuni himself, by in­
cluding the practice of dhyina with its aim of suspending conceptual thinking, 
introduced an element into Buddhism that fundamentally denies the wisdom 
that is the very goal of Buddhism” (B 244 =  Matsumoto 1994:4); (2) the Pali 
sutta texts, except where corrupted by atmavada and Indian conventions; (3) 
the earlier stages of the Prajfiaparamita literature; (4) the Lotus Sfitra: contra­
ry to what Nakamura Hajime claims, its teaching that all sentient beings will 
attain buddhahood is innocent of the later tathagatagarbha substantialism (E 
4-5; B 168-9; note that in the diagram on B 169 the arrow should be a non­
identity sign); (4) N igirjuna and the Prasangika version of Madhyamika 
down to Tsong-ka-pa; (5) Chih-i; (6) DOgen in his later writings, which are 
purified of his earlier dabbling in hongaku shisO (the Tendai ideology of origi­
nal enlightenment).
In weeding out heresy it is easy to make a misdiagnosis that is perpetuat­
ed and becomes a heresy in turn. CB’s attitude to indigenous Indian and 
Chinese influences recalls Marcion’s bid to strip Christianity of all elements of 
Judaism. Marcion’s attempt to isolate a “ canon within the canon” is the nar­
rowest in Christian tradition. CB’s reduction of authentic Buddhist tradition 
to a very few texts that are pure and above suspicion is almost as radical. 
Against the hermeneutic generosity of textual history, which constantly stifles 
new revolutionary insights, Hakamaya wants a critical sifting of the good 
texts from the bad ones that conceal them (Hakamaya 1992:191).
For CB the essence of Buddhism is “ the twelve-membered chain of depend­
ent arising as taught in the Mahdvagga, which I [want to] believe to be the 
twelvefold chain of dependent arising that $3kyamuni pondered in its forward 
and reverse order, and to the truth of which he was awakened” (B 165 =  E 1, 
translation modified). This is conceived of as a clearly expressed conceptual
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doctrine, stable throughout Buddhist history, though ignored more often than 
not. Matsumoto accepts that the twelve-membered formula is a late, compo­
site formulation, but nonetheless stresses, as a matter of belief, that it must 
have formed the content of the Buddha’s enlightenment (E 22). Satori is seen 
as a non-religious expression (E 52), for the Buddha’s enlightenment has noth­
ing to do with mysticism or ineffable intuition; rather it is the attainment of a 
correct intellectual vision of the real. Similarly nirvana must be purified of in­
digenous Indian notions of “ extinction” and “ cessation”  and be reinterpret­
ed in a distinctively Buddhist style as an “ uncovering”  of the truth of depend­
ent co-arising, even though the philological arguments for this are confessed 
to be inconclusive (E 5). Matsumoto affirms these beliefs in resistance to scho­
larly objectivists, who are too cautious about expressing definitive judgments. 
In reality, he claims, scholarship is essentially subjective; objective study is 
only a stage on the way to final subjective understanding (E 78).
He rejects Tamaki KOshirO’s view that the dhamma is an abiding reality en­
countered in immediate intuition as an ineffable “ pure life, without form”  (E 
58) and that all Buddhist teachings are merely skilful means, fingers pointing 
to this changeless moon. “ But what has this beautiful language to do with the 
Buddha’s bitter words: impermanence, non-self, suffering?”  (E 59). He re­
jects also Nakamura’s thesis that the theory of dependent co-arising is later 
than and independent of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience (E 52), and 
he queries Nakamura’s claim that the verse-portions are the oldest passages 
in the early suttas and reflect the priority of an ineffable enlightenment ex­
perience over its subsequent articulation in doctrines (Nara 1992:44). In oppos­
ing those who break the connection between the Buddha’s enlightenment and 
dependent co-arising (E 14), Matsumoto shows an orthodox instinct. To sever 
dhyana from prajnQ, enlightenment from insight into dependent co-arising, is 
as subversive of Buddhism as to sever the divinity from the humanity of Jesus 
is for Christianity. But then the question arises: does not CB itself threaten 
this unity by playing down the importance of dhySnal We will also have to 
ask if history obligingly substantiates the unity postulated by dogma, or 
whether, both in the Christian and the Buddhist cases, the historical facts have 
to be construed in light of orthodoxy, forcing them at times to yield the an­
swers dogma demands.
Freeing Buddhist Realism from  Mystical Corruption
The combination of an acute existential sentiment with a distaste for any­
thing savoring of the mystical is quite reminiscent of the dialectical theology 
of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, as is the dramatic polemical tone of the de­
bate CB has launched. As Oe Kenzaburd and many others have lamented,
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Japan today does not have a rich culture of discussion and argument. Scholars 
stifle their criticisms of predecessors in the name of “ peaceful coexistence’’ (E 
17). When they do take a critical stand, they tend to be shrill and confronta­
tional. CB’s excesses reflect frustration with its cultural environment, what it 
sees as a deeply rooted aversion to argument and concept among Zen prac­
titioners and Japanist ideologists. Remembering how unfair the dialectical the­
ologians were to their liberal predecessors, I prefer to take most of CB’s broad­
sides with a grain of salt.
Hakamaya and Matsumoto put their own personal lives in the forefront of 
their writing; diary excerpts, reminiscences, and circumstantial day by day ac­
counts of their scholarly activities abound. This strategy of personalization 
gives their critical presence maximum impact. Matsumoto believes in a 
“ religious time” irreducible to spatialized or logical terms. Thus his essay on 
dependent co-arising (E 11-97) takes the unorthodox form of a series of dated 
entries. Dissatisfied with the accounts of duration and intuition in Bergson’s 
Essai sur les donates immteiiates de la conscience, he turns to the only other 
Western philosophical text he recalls reading, Descartes’ Discours de la 
methode, finding there a more genuine religious temporality (E 15). Similarly, 
Hakamaya rejects Taoism as a return to animal existence, and opts for the 
‘younger’ sense of dependently arisen temporality lived by Confucius, which 
is cleanly defined by causal connections, in sharp contrast to the blurry theo­
ries that have detemporalized and thus eliminated Buddhist causality in East 
Asia (Hakamaya 1992:96).
Against Watsuji and Ui, who make dependent co-arising a spatialized, 
simultaneous mutual interdependence, and against Hirakawa, who speaks of 
it as a general principle, Matsumoto insists that the doctrine makes no sense 
except in terms of religious time, marked by causal sequence, direction, and 
irreversibility (E 4). Against the totalizing cosmic language of Kegon Buddhism, 
he stresses, with Kierkegaard, that we live on a narrow path of subjective tem­
porality, a temporality of crisis (E 34). But is a Kierkegaardian model of tem­
porality really suited to Buddhism?
Matsumoto accuses scholars of religion, including himself, of lacking faith 
and a consciousness of sin (E 19). He expresses shock at an account of the prin­
ciple of dependent co-arising that would make the Buddha merely its dis­
coverer, and sees this as a sign of diluted faith (E 47). He seems to be pressing 
Buddhism into a Christian mould, wanting to make the Buddha a savior figure 
similar to Jesus. He treats the Buddha’s word as Christian biblicists treat the 
word of Scripture: “ If Buddhism were only substance (principle) or ineffable 
experience (satori), our capacity or incapacity to express it in language would 
be a big issue. But the language in question here is the Buddha’s word, which 
is Buddhism itself. This word, already given to us from the Buddha, is not an
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article we can alter at our convenience. . . . Not a phrase or a letter may be 
altered; there is no alternative to simply accepting it in faith. In religion 
‘language’ means the Buddha’s word, God’s word, not the self-willed word of 
humans” (E 56). But is it not misleading to present the word of the Buddha as a 
dogmatic one, demanding the submission of faith, rather than an instrument 
for awakening insight?
All appeals to mysticism, mental concentration, satori, “ pure experience” 
(Nishida) are overruled by the authority of the Buddha’s word. This is reminis­
cent of Brunner’s sharp opposition of “ mysticism” and “ the Word”  in his at­
tack on Schleiermacher, a strategy rejected by Barth, who better appreciated 
Schleiermacher’s sensitivity to the human and historical mediations of the bib­
lical word. It looks as if the influence of Christian radicalism underlies Ma­
tsumoto’s emphasis on dependent co-arising as the articulus stands et cadentis 
Buddhismi. If the succession of dharmas in religious time is truly non-substan- 
tial, then the account of the law operative in them should not have the stability 
and fixity Matsumoto claims for it. The teaching of dependent co-arising 
should be as fluid, subtle, existential as the phenomenon to which it would 
awaken us. If one must draw on Christian models, then it should have the 
dialectical suppleness of Luther’s doctrine of justification. But perhaps Ma­
tsumoto is moving in this direction.
For CB all thought is conceptual and any effort to set conceptual thought in 
a wider context is caricatured as a flight from reason. Thus Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology is seen as the “ antithesis” of the authentic 
philosophical tradition (Hakamaya 1994:11). Heidegger is presented as seek­
ing a hidden background in the metaphysical tradition exactly as Yogdcard her­
meneutics seeks the hidden background of the two earlier turnings of the 
dharma-wheel (in the Buddha’s first sermon and in the PrajAfipfiramitfi sutras). 
Here Hakamaya falls into the same "sokkuri da!” mentality that he criticizes 
in syncretists and comparatists. Heidegger’s return to the phenomena was not 
a quest for a hidden background, but the rediscovery of what lay close to 
hand. Similarly, in Buddhism, Zen is not the quest for esoteric insight, but a 
matter of attending to the suchness of impermanent dependently co-arising 
phenomena. Some would argue that Yog&carA similarly represents a cleansing 
of the Buddhist mind rather than the discovery of a hidden substantialist foun­
dation.
Pre-conceptual contemplative thinking, such as Heidegger practices, does 
not imply a contempt for concepts and language, as Hakamaya’s dualism 
forces him to think. Zen, of course, lies open to the same misunderstanding, 
and Hakamaya does not hesitate to cut off this limb which scandalizes him. 
Zen is not Buddhism! Matsumoto rejects pre-verbal experience and ineffabil- 
ity (Nara 1992:44). The indigenous Indian system of dhyana or yoga is wrong-
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ly glorified by Zen. For the Buddha it was used only as a means to the end of 
prajfia, which consists essentially in intellectual consideration of dependent 
co-arising, not in a d/tyj/nr-style cessation of thinking. “ I see Zen as synony­
mous with with the cessation of conceptual thinking, its aim being to induce 
the suppression of thought. If this is true, and if we grant the obvious point (!) 
that wisdom is the fruit of conceptual thought, then the only conclusion we 
are left with is that Zen thought is the negation or rejection of wisdom” (B 
243 =  Z 3). Yamaguchi ZuihO defines the “ perfection of wisdom” in even 
more starkly intellectualist terms: “ To cultivate firm intellectual convictions 
regarding the supreme truth, and thus to overcome ordinary human substan­
tialist thinking” (B 236). This author reduces phenomenality to the concep­
tual: the “ state of the phenomenal world can be inferred, and on the basis of 
this inference treated as logical knowledge”  (B 235).
Against such reductionism, I would object that nirvana is more than insight 
into the twelvefold chain of dependent co-arising; it is the breaking of the 
chain, the realization of a condition beyond dependent co-arising. Intellectual 
prajfia does not suffice to achieve this release; the conversion of the mind must 
be followed by the more difficult conversion of feelings and instincts, and 
dhyOna is an essential weapon in this task. DhyOna separated from prajfia is 
blind and falls into OtmavOda; but prajfia which is not actualized in dhyana is 
empty and effects no real transformation of the agent. Prajfia cannot be for­
mulated in a final, definitive way; every formulation has to be sustained by 
dhyana, by a contemplative Stimmung, to retain its spiritual significance as a 
skillful means pointing to ultimate truth. Pra/Tfa-formulations are always con­
text-dependent, and dhyOna may push for their revision in accord with a new 
context, insofar as dhyana alerts one to the conventional fabric of all formula­
tions and keeps alive the tension between conventional and ultimate truth. But 
prajfia deconstructs dhyOna’s  absolutism in turn, recalling it to the world of 
empty dependently arising convention, to acceptance of the provisionality of 
any contextual formulation.
Sallie King points out that a merely theoretical grasp of dependent co­
arising is “ impureparatantra” (B 188); only in an intuitive grasp of the “ thusness 
revealed by the dual emptiness of person and things” (B 184), before the 
differentation of subject and object implicit in theoretical thinking, does one 
break through to purified paratantra (parinispanna); the latter is not an extra 
dimension added by Yogacara for substantialist purposes but a deepening of 
the vision of dependent co-arising that brings out its phenomenological force. 
“ Emptiness also is form and not apart from it. One returns very solidly to 
form, remembering its emptiness, but recognizing it as the totality or fullness 
of what is”  (King 1991:106). Matsumoto would reply that such “ non- 
discriminatory cognition (nirvikalpa jfiana) that transcends even the distinc-
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tions between subject and object”  (B 243) has no basis in early Buddhism. 
N igirjuna used the expression once (MMK 18.9); Matsumoto claims that nir- 
vikalpa here has not an affirmative sense, yet it is used to denote along with 
“ quiescence” and “ absence of mental fabrications”  the nature of “ such­
ness” —all of which accords very well with the standard Buddhist under­
standing Matsumoto would like to subvert. In any case, he claims, NSgftr- 
juna’s lack of caution launched the fateful career of nondiscriminating 
cognition in Yogficfira and in later versions of the text of the PrajAapiramita 
stltras; it is not found in earlier versions as reflected in the Chinese translations 
(E 240-5). One might reply that such nondiscriminatory cognition is implicit 
in the early Buddhist accounts of dhyOna, much as the idea of StinyatQ is. 
That it was not immediately made explicit has perhaps to do with a relative 
lack of philosophical sophistication in early Buddhism. What Cardinal New­
man would call the “ idea”  of the religion took time to unfold. In any case, 
Matsumoto would then regard it as a yogic seed of corruption present in Bud­
dhism from the start. It is rather hard to argue with CB, since it has discredit­
ed most of the bases in Mahayana and even in early Buddhism from which the 
argument could start.
The Disparagement o f  Hermeneutics and the Hermeneutics o f  Disparagement
Religion is self-criticism. But it is not only criticism: the criticism is at the 
service of a radiant vision, to be accepted in contemplation. In focusing exces­
sively on criticism and in reducing Buddhism, as well as philosophy (B 62 =  
HB 13), to criticism, CB develops a hermeneutic that cannot do justice to the 
contemplative aspects of Buddhism, or to the phenomenological ground of 
philosophy, neither of which are reducible to conceptual clarification. Since 
CB is dismissive of the very idea of hermeneutics, writing off centuries of her­
meneutical reflection in the West as a betrayal of Western reason, it misses the 
degree to which its own positivistic and rationalistic stance is itself a hermeneu­
tical investment. One forgoes sophisticated hermeneutics only under pain of 
falling into naive hermeneutics. Mountains of erudition cannot save CB from 
this fate. A critical confessional thinking has nothing to fear from hermeneuti­
cal sophistication. It must even flirt with the abyss of relativism if it is to do 
justice to the historical conditions in which orthodoxy is fashioned and de­
velops. Barth, the great orthodox theologian of this century, understood this 
so well that he often reads as a deconstructionist avant la lettre. It is to be 
hoped that CB may yet attain the plateau of Barthian subtlety where it can 
deploy its potential more fully.
Matsumoto sees hermeneutics as opening the door to Jain perspectivism 
and to postmodern relativism. To accept a pluralism of interpretations within
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a religious tradition is nothing other than relativism. He sees the breakdown 
of Christian absolutism in the West as having plunged Western culture into 
relativistic confusion. Religions must be absolutist, he declares. Orientalists, 
disillusioned with Western rationalism, plunge into reckless relativism (Nara 
1992:41-2). Here a hermeneutist would differentiate: at the core of religious 
experience is an absolute reality, which is indubitable; the doctrines of religion 
share this absolute quality; but they are always enunciated in the language and 
horizon of a given epoch and culture, and this dimension of religion is intrinsi* 
cally relative.
One may welcome the critique of a “ folk Buddhism”  which holds 
that “ Buddhist doctrine is of no value or at best only of formal value, thereby 
uncritically absolutizing the base of religious consciousness shared by 
the Japanese ‘masses* ” (B 358 =  E 101). Nonetheless Japanese folk religiosity is 
of value as a practical contextualization of Buddhist doctrine, though monas­
tic Zen culture, for example, may be a higher and more orthodox realization. 
The social and practical context CB envisages for its pure Buddhist doctrine is 
not well-defined; constant utopian protest would not be a sufficient embodi­
ment of Buddhist wisdom.
Lacking a comprehensive hermeneutic frame of understanding, Matsumoto 
is prone to textual fetishism. Any use of Otman or attan or even of language 
suggesting such associations (as in Lin-chi) suffices to convict its user of sub- 
stantialism. Thus the word attan in the Sutta-Nipfita is read as a relapse into 
Indian OtmavQda. Such a method could disqualify any Buddhist found guilty 
of using suspect expressions such as “ I”  or “ self.”  Sallie King shows that the 
Buddha-Nature Treatise (T No. 1610,31.787-813) uses substantialist language 
as a skillful means and vigilantly subordinates it to Buddhist convictions 
about dependent co-arising and emptiness. Atman-language can be used in a 
consciously non-substantial sense: “ the supreme not-self that is the perfection 
of self* (T 31.798c 11-12, quoted B 178). “ Ontologically, universal anatman 
is the final word; but linguistically and strategically, another word—a positive 
word—needs to be added” (B 179). Such flexibility offers a justification for 
the pluralism of Buddhist tradition and spares it from the painful amputations 
CB proposes.
But can language be divorced from its natural associations? Is the notion of 
skilful means invoked here to whitewash a betrayal of Buddhist non-self? As 
Sadagata Akira remarks in a pop CB attack on substantialist Yogacar a lan­
guage: “ If you’re slightly worried, just stick on the label, this is not a  sub­
stance, and no one will complain”  (Sadagata 1990:140). The issue of the 
validity of substantial language as a skillful means is perhaps one that cannot 
be brought to rest, and that invites us to constantly renewed critical engage­
ment with the classic texts. Such endless questioning is not a betrayal of deci-
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sive faith, as CB thinks, but the climate in which faith grows in under­
standing.
For CB, frequent use of the term “ emptiness”  is not enough to place one 
above suspicion. Indeed, it invites suspicion, for emptiness turns out to be the 
subtlest enemy of dependent co-arising. Dependent co-arising, Matsumoto ar­
gues, was increasingly occluded by emptiness as the PrajAapiramita tradition 
developed. Interpretations of Nagftrjuna have stressed emptiness, missing the 
point that the deconstructions offered in the first twenty-five chapters of the 
MMK serve only to clear the ground for the consideration of dependent co-ar­
ising in the twenty-sixth chapter. This chapter seems an anti-climax, offering 
only dull Buddhist doctrine. But to grasp this doctrine correctly is to enjoy 
prajM y the highest blessing of Buddhism.
The most remarkable example of CB’s textual fetishism is the authority 
ascribed to the 12-fascicle text of DOgen’s ShObOgenzO by Hakamaya. This 
text offers elementary instruction in dependent co-arising, rather an anti­
climax after the dazzling paradoxes of the 75-fascicle text. But for CB precisely 
this basic teaching is the deepest wisdom, and must be prized higher than 
DOgen’s earlier writings, inspired but tainted. There is a puritanical chill in the 
air in the 12-fascicle text, with its warnings against errors of doctrine and dis­
cipline. The poetic vision of the great texts such as “ Buddha-nature”  is in 
abeyance. The same chill pervades CB, in its reduction of Buddhism to a lean 
critical regime, an incessant dismantling of temptations to Otmavada. DOgen’s 
teaching that impermanence is Buddha-nature, a teaching that has both a 
strong critical thrust and a liberating impact, is amputated in CB, which 
purges the Soto master’s language of references to Buddha-nature, so that 
only impermanence (dependent co-arising) remains. DOgen may have been 
alarmed by his disciples’ enthusiasm for the quietistic overtones of his hon- 
gaku thought, and like St Paul been forced to turn his attention to elementary 
morals to ward off antinomianism (Putney 1996). But there is no reason to be­
lieve that this meant jettisoning his earlier thought. DOgen specialist Carl 
Bielefeldt rejects the philosophical reductionism and the senchaku (selective) 
approach that disauthorizes most texts of Buddhist tradition, and its corollary 
that those who accept such texts are rejected as non-Buddhist. He speaks of 
“ the ‘Protestantization’ of the dharma that weeds out the rich overgrowth of 
art and literature, myth and ritual, and in the process cuts off most possibili­
ties for being Buddhist.”
Another way in which CB compensates for the lack of a subtle hermeneutic 
is by its recourse to stark dichotomies which cut violently across the texture of 
history. Hakamaya opposes critical thinking to topical thinking, that is, any 
philosophy which tries to “ place” rational, logical discourse in a larger con­
text. But Vico promoted the method of inventio as a preparation for and con-
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text of critical thinking (see Miner 1998), just as for Aristotle rhetoric is not 
the opposite of dialectic, but its counterpart. Hakamaya simply portrays Vico 
as anti-critical and explains thereby Vico’s recent popularity in Japan. “ After 
Descartes had gone to all the trouble of extracting the method of ’philosophy’ 
out of the antiphilosophical traditions of Europe, why must we once again 
return to this antiphilosophy?’’ (B 61 =  HB 12). But Vico is a forerunner of 
the hermeneutical tradition of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and many others, 
which has long been integrated into the critical thrust of European thought.
Such attempts to rip apart what history has sewn together show an im­
patience with the processes of Verstehen, identified with “ the idea that final 
judgments are to be ever postponed’’ (B 166 =  E 1). Impatience facilitates a 
rush to judgment. Thus Hakamaya admits not having read Nishitani Keiji, 
but a glance at a few pages suffices to assure him that Nishitani is much the 
same as Hisamatsu Shin’ichi (whose “ slovenliness”  angers him), and a propo­
nent of what Paul J. Griffiths identifies as an “ esoterist-triumphalist posi­
tion” ; and in any case the political blindness of the Kyoto School discredits it 
(HB 242). The hermeneutic grid of CB hardly prepares it to appreciate the ra­
tionality of the kind of phenomenological thinking pursued by Hisamatsu or 
Nishitani. Hakamaya applauds Griffiths’s jejune criticism that Nishitani 
does not offer logical demonstrations of his claims (HB 241). But as Heidegger 
would say, much can be “ shown” that cannot be “ demonstrated.”
Hakamaya admires Griffiths’s rather wooden insistence on “ demonstration 
and logical proof as the proper mode of interreligious dialogue”  (B 59), and 
he sees the resistance of other Western scholars to Griffiths as due to contami­
nation by Japanese woolly thinking (HB 221-47). Griffiths turns the tables on 
historians such as Lambert Schmithausen who have contested Hakamaya’s 
narrowness and Cartesian rationalism by portraying them as Weberian 
positivists, infected by the “ self-congratulatory superiority so evident in the 
works of Weber himself”  (B 151). But Weber was far too aware of Kant, 
Nietzsche, and Dilthey to be called a positivist. Pique at his negative prog­
noses about religion and his denial of scientific status to theology leads 
Griffiths to dismiss as a fatuous boast the “ trained ability to look at realities 
of life with an unsparing gaze, to bear these realities and be a match for them 
inwardly”  (Weber 1996:367) which Weber showed in his scholarship no less 
than in his political thought. CB trouncings of Weber (HB 93-4, 120-5 = B 
113-14, 130-2; E 99-100 =  B 356) also undervalue his intellectual subtlety. 
Weber’s ideal is said to be: “ Let the facts speak for themselves”  (B 130 =  HB 
121); but what he actually wrote was: “ The authentic teacher will refrain from 
forcing any political stance on his hearer, either explicitly, or through sugges­
tion—the latter being of course the most treacherous tactic, when one ’lets the 
facts speak for themselves* ” (Weber 1922:543). Weber would agree with CB
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that objective study cannot replace subjective understanding in matters of 
religious or political decision; but he embraces the ordeal of objectivity, refus­
ing to make things easy for himself by ideological steamrolling. Weber could 
have been invoked as an antidote to the right-wing obfuscations which are 
paraded as “ objective” history in Japan (see HB 119 =  B 129). But he could 
also temper the ideological directness of CB, even while understanding that it 
is a noble reaction to social and historical injustice and an inert and stifling aca­
demic culture. John Rex’s diagnosis seems applicable here: “ Weber is unac­
ceptable to two groups in academic and intellectual life. There are those 
professional academics who are fearful that they might have to move from 
their secure social position as technicians and take a wider view of their own 
society than would be thought respectable or even permissible. For them, the 
danger in Weber is that he raises the question of value-relevance. On the other 
hand, there are the ideologues who now, if it is not too strong a word, infest 
our universities with pure political propaganda. For them, the danger of We­
ber is his emphasis on value-freedom” (Hamilton 1991:238). Hermeneutical 
short-cuts underlie CB’s disparagement of Vico, Weber, and Heidegger. One 
is prompted to suspect that the Japanese targets have been given equally short 
shrift.
For a Critical Ecumenical Historical Pluralism
For CB every text, every doctrine, even every personality, is given a straight­
forward interpretation and evaluation. There is little room for the discovery 
of significant tensions and fault-lines in ancient texts, and indeed little sense of 
how rich and complex these texts are. CB would reject as relativism the view 
of Peter N. Gregory: “ Doctrines never have a simple and straightforward sin­
gular meaning but are always multivalent and complexly nuanced formula­
tions that are susceptible to a wide range of interpretive possibilities”  (B 290). 
Gregory does fall into relativism when he dismisses “ theological”  concerns 
about truth as old-fashioned, ascribing their re-emergence among Japanese 
scholars to the influence of Meiji-era Protestantism. I would side with the theo­
logical quest of CB against Gregory’s rather complacent celebration of the so­
ciological and anthropological orientation of departments of religious studies. 
To scholars ensconced in historical reflection, who may refuse to articulate, 
far less assess, the ideological (or “ theological” ) commitments that guide their 
research, a critical ferment coming from one of the heartlands of Buddhism 
may serve to relaunch thought (as opposed to the mere history of thought).
“ Dogma or doctrine is only one aspect (and not necessarily one to be 
privileged) of the complex and many-faceted phenomenon we refer to as ‘Bud­
dhism’ ” (B 294). Here again Gregory flirts with a positivistic historicism. The
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status of doctrine cannot be read off from the results of historical, anthropo­
logical observation. Granted that it may not be what is of first importance in 
Buddhism, may even be only a skillful means, nonetheless the Four Truths 
(with dependent co-arising as part of the second truth) and the teachings of im­
permanence, non-self, emptiness, are surely entitled to a place of privilege. If 
one substituted “ science”  or “ philosophy” for “ Buddhism” in the above 
quotation, Gregory would be an advocate of ultra-Feyerabendian irrational­
ism. “ A pragmatic approach to truth according to which doctrines have only 
a provisional status”  (B 295) is too soft an account of the epistemic claims of 
the Buddhist dharma. Gregory stresses the pluralism of early Buddhism, but 
to the point of complete scepticism about the content of the Buddha’s teach­
ing. Between this and CB’s obsession with pure origins, a middle way of trust 
in the tradition can be mapped. Simply to give up as hopeless the problem of 
identifying the Buddha’s teaching is a facile retreat from “ theological” her­
meneutics, just as is Matsumoto’s fideistic claim that it is the scholars’ fuss 
about objectivity that has created the problem. Even if the Buddha were an ab­
sent origin, this would still pose a question to be wrestled with “ theological­
ly.” Gregory thinks that the Atthakavagga in the Suttanipata rejects the idea 
that there is a right view, along with the possibility of formulating “ truth” 
in propositional form (B 296). Between this and CB’s rejection of the 
Atthakavagga as a substantialist corruption lies the Buddhist middle way of 
non-attachment to views.
A doctrine that baffles attempts at black-and-white judgment is hongaku 
shisO. Gregory is happy to see it reproblematized, but wants a more flexible 
and historically conscious method of assessing its various uses. To dismiss any­
one who bathes in the atmosphere of hongaku shisO as non-Buddhist is un­
justifiable. Hongaku functions differently in China from what CB leads one to 
expect; it served as a bulwark against antinomianism in China. In Korea, too, 
as Muller and McFarlane point out, hongaku did not have negative political 
effects and did not inhibit critical thinking. Moreover, “ for Tsung-mi and the 
textual and doctrinal tradition from which he drew, hongaku was tied to a 
positive valuation of language and thus cannot be understood as entailing an 
authoritarian denial of the validity of words and concepts as Hakamaya 
charges”  (B 289). Muller likewise criticizes the monist interpretation of Tao­
ism in CB, and points out that Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu never discredit discur­
sive thought (contra D 91). The conclusion to be drawn is that one cannot 
evaluate a tradition a priori; it is necessary to see how a teaching works in 
specific contexts, taking an integral view, with due attention to the performa­
tive soteriological intention of the teaching.
Theology asks a lot of history, and history more often than not disappoints 
its demand. If dogma declares that the twelvefold dependent co-arising is the
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essence of Buddhism, then as a matter of logic it must have been present from 
the start, at least implicitly, whatever the historical record shows. If Buddhism 
is essentially criticism, even though this is “ not principally a historical thesis, 
but rather a critically normative philosophical thesis”  (Griffiths, B 158), 
nonetheless it requires substantial embodiment in exemplary historical figures 
such as the Buddha himself. But in the end theology may be forced to tolerate 
a gap between the clarity of dogma and the murkiness of historical facts, or to 
adjust the dogma to fit the facts (as the Christian resurrection-faith is 
rephrased when historical criticism reveals the largely mythical texture of the 
resurrection narratives).
CB, insofar as it fails to see the gap between its own simple yardsticks and 
the unending complexity of history, courts a blindness to history, laced with 
what Heidegger calls “ blindness to being.” The uprooting of dogma from its 
historical context goes hand in hand with an uprooting from its contemplative 
context. Dogma is no longer seen as a fragile and always incomplete historical 
product, serving as a skillful means to be rethought and redeployed in chang­
ing contexts; instead it enjoys a self-sufficient conceptual clarity which makes 
it the unchallenged master of every life context or historical context to which it 
is applied. Here the humbling and liberating lessons of centuries of Western 
theological hermeneutics have gone unlearned.
For my part, I do not believe that a religious tradition has a single essence 
that can be delineated in canonical formulae. Rather, a great religion is a tradi­
tion animated by a spirit or an “ idea” which forges its way through history, 
and finds a great variety of expressions. Any canonical presentation of the 
religion’s vision—be it the Nicene Creed or the Four Noble Truths—has a stra­
tegic function within a historical context. In subsequent use the canonical for­
mula will accrue new functions or may even need to be replaced by a new for­
mula that gives better strategic expression to what is central in the idea of the 
religion. This historical process of a religion’s self-presentation is never a tidy 
one. It has rough edges and inconsistencies that can never be ironed out. The 
purism of CB, like classical Protestant efforts to isolate the “ essence of Christi­
anity,”  cuts across the texture of history and curbs the creative potential of 
the pluralism endemic to history. Just as there is no monolithic true Bud­
dhism, neither is TathOgatagarbha thought or hongaku shisO a  monolith; all 
these traditions have been and will be subject to ongoing modification.
Origins are not always privileged over subsequent developments, for it takes 
time for the full meaning of a religious innovation to unfold. Because of this, 
and of the changing intellectual contexts, we may expect there to be un­
resolved contradictions between early and later Buddhism, as in Christianity. 
Sometimes these contradictions will be a challenge to the legitimacy of later de­
velopments; sometimes the later developments will put the presuppositions of
291
T H E  E A ST E R N  B U D D H IST  X X X I, 2
the earlier context in question; sometimes the relation between incommensura­
ble mental frameworks will place us in a situation of undecidability. Indeed, 
our relation to the entire previous tradition is marked by this mutual challenge 
and frequent undecidability, which both frees us for, and obliges us to, a new 
construction of Buddhist or Christian truth. That the past dies, that the 
present is flimsy and provisional, that we must “ walk into the future back­
ward” (Vatery), is the texture of historicity, and it is just what dependent co­
arising would lead one to expect.
History is impure, and it prescribes that there will be an irremediable plural­
ism and relativism at the origin even of the most commanding traditions. 
Religions are historical formations, and are exposed to just the same plurality 
and inconsistency as other traditions, that of philosophy for instance. In at­
tempting to reduce Buddhism to a masterable orthodoxy CB invests in a myth 
of pure origins which modem historical consciousness has eroded. Buddha's 
framework was fully shared by his hearers and his message made perfect sense 
to them. But now it is archaic and an acculturation of the message is required, 
a dynamic equivalent of its impact in the old framework. Translation is re­
quired.
All religions need to be demystified and demythologized; they need to shed 
archaic mindsets which undermine their credibility and salutary power today. 
Hakamaya seems to lack the demythologizing instinct: “ I couldn't believe my 
ears when, in the course of his talk, Fujiyoshi [ Jikai] remarked that, ‘the Para­
dise of the Western Pure Land is an upttya,9 From the time when he was a 
child gazing up at the sun sinking into the Ariake Sea to the West, he had been 
raised to believe that his deceased father had gone there, to the Paradise in the 
West” (B 125). But does Hakamaya himself believe in the Pure Land? Does he 
believe in the Christian doctrines he accuses liberal theologians of diluting? If 
not, should he not be happy that demythologizers have come closer to truth? 
In any case, Fujiyoshi *s proposal is not a bolt from the liberal blue; it 
resonates with tendencies in Pure Land tradition (Ippen), just as Bultmann 
draws on the spiritualizing hermeneutics of Paul or John. But of course CB 
would see Ippen as corrupted by ideas of hongaku and Buddha-nature.
In an age of religious pluralism, criticism will push all religions to temper or 
recontextualize their claims. Sometimes the critique may link up with a delica­
cy and subtlety in older formulations that was lost when they hardened into 
dogmatic slogans and scholastic assumptions; sometimes the later formula­
tions may be the ones that show greater finesse, and criticism will build on 
them rather than reverse them; sometimes it is the entire tradition that has to 
be sublated to a more refined level. Given all this, a critical retrieval and over­
coming of tradition has to adopt a principle of hermeneutic charity, ready to 
find and forgive deficiencies even in the most orthodox strands and to seek out
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the wisdom buried even in the most heterodox. Instead of assessing and dis­
missing traditions on the basis of a few suspect expressions, such a hermeneu­
tics would set the traditions in dialogal interaction.
Confucianism can be deployed as critique of Taoism, Buddhism as critique 
of Hinduism, and basic contradictions between the rival traditions may be 
identified. But the critique is also likely to work both ways. All religious tradi­
tions exist in a deconstructive ferment as their “ idea” interacts with extrane­
ous elements which may enhance or damage it. The mutual deconstruction of 
Hebrew and Hellenic in the woof and warp of Christian tradition is paralleled 
by similar tensions within East Asian Buddhism between its Indic origins and 
its Sinicization. Hakamaya rejects the possibility of a mutual deconstruction 
between Zen and Pure Land, between Christianity and Buddhism, between 
the kinds of Buddhism he opposes and those he treasures. The fecundity of 
religious pluralism, and the greatness of the spiritual task of interpretation it 
presents to all religious seekers, are completely missed if one sees it only as a 
headache for orthodoxy and for clear thinking. The higher pluralistic vision is 
not just a lazy tolerance; it is a rigorous search for the full context within 
which religious and philosophical contradictions emerge, and which puts these 
contradictions in perspective.
Rather than insist on orthodoxy in a condemnatory style, or dismiss it as an 
irrelevance (Gregory), what is needed is a Buddhist ecumenism, in which criti­
cal debate between the various styles of the religion is reopened, allowing the 
Indian sources to challenge anew the Sinitic traditions, but also allowing these 
traditions a critical voice, so that no tradition is allowed to bask complacently 
in its own truth but is consigned instead to constant dialogal give and take 
with the others. Such a hermeneutic will expect to find within Zen and within 
TathSgatagarbha thought a recurrence of the constant battle between enlight­
ened insight into dependent co-arising and the temptation of substantialism 
(which includes the hardening of Buddhist wisdom into a view). The critical vi­
sion will ramify as it lodges intimately in the traditions it engages. The bodhi 
tree, instead of being lopped, will be rerooted in truly open dialogue between 
the mutually interdependent and dependently co-arisen traditions, which have 
served over centuries as effective channels of bodhi.
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